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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David McPeak appeals from his conviction for burglary, and possession of 
controlled substances (methamphetamine and marijuana), following a jury trial. 
McPeak challenges the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence found 
and seized during an investigative detention. McPeak also contends his seven-
year fixed sentence was excessive. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged McPeak with one felony count of burglary, one felony 
count of aggravated assault, one felony count of possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), and one misdemeanor count of possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana). (R., pp. 19-21.) McPeak filed a motion to 
suppress, asserting that the search and seizure of his vehicle had been illegal. 
(R., pp. 33-39, 40-47, 61-63.) The state responded that McPeak had voluntarily 
stopped his vehicle, and police were justified in detaining McPeak and searching 
his vehicle based on the totality of circumstances. (R., pp. 52-59.) 
The district court made the following oral findings of fact at the 
suppression hearing: 
[T]he officer actually didn't initiate a stop. The defendant 
himself stopped, and the officer stopped behind him. At that point 
when the spotlight goes on, I suppose at that point there's a 
detention. And then of course when the overhead lights go on it 
seems clear that he's being detained at that time. . .. [The officer] 
had reported to him that there was an assault at a location, 
although not a block away it's within the vicinity, that the vehicle 
leaving the scene was a white Ford 50 vehicle which he 
stopped behind. There were unusual behavior[s] going on with this 
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Ford pickup, that is it slowed to 15 miles an hour speed in a mile 
an hour zone, turned the corner and slowed five miles an hour 
and actually stopped, and then there was all sorts of movement 
inside the pickup which is all indicative of maybe there's criminal 
activity afoot. 
He's detained them for 30 seconds to a minute until the 
other officers arrive. They're asked to exit the vehicle. And, 
indeed, this defendant is identified as David McPeak, who 
apparently the person assaulted identified specifically as being 
David McPeak. 
So now at this point in time the officer does have evidence 
to support detention and also sees in plain sight three knives in the 
vehicle, which again he was informed that there was a knife used in 
this assault, so seizing those knives would be consistent with his 
ability to search the vehicle for evidence of this assault that 
occurred earlier. 
During the course of this search he smells even the faint 
odor of marijuana. 
(11/13/12 Tr., p. 52, L. 16 - p. 53, L. 24.) The court concluded that police were 
allowed "at least to search for other contraband, other illegal drugs in the 
vehicle." (11/13/12 Tr., p. 54., Ls. 2-5.) The court further concluded the officer 
had "the ability given the probable cause of the assault to search the vehicle 
further for any other weapons that might be evidence of this crime of assault that 
occurred earlier in the evening." (11/13/12 Tr., p. 54, Ls. 5-9.) The court 
therefore denied McPeak's motion to suppress. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 54, Ls. 10-11.) 
The court also denied McPeak's motion to dismiss. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 63, 
1.) The matter proceeded to trial, and - relevant to this appeal - a jury found 
McPeak guilty of burglary and possession of methamphetamine and marijuana; 
the jury found him not guilty of aggravated assault. (R., pp. 137-39.) The court 
sentenced McPeak to a unified term of ten years in prison with seven years fixed 
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on the felony burglary count, and an indeterminate term of seven years on the 
felony possession of methamphetamine count, to run consecutively. (R., pp. 
194, 198-99, 211-13.) The court also retained jurisdiction. (R., p. 194.) On the 
misdemeanor count of possession of marijuana, the court ordered McPeak to 
serve 180 days in jail with credit for 180 days served. (R., p. 200.) 
McPeak timely appealed. (R., pp. 201-03.) 
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ISSUES 
McPeak on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McPeak's motion 
to suppress? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing 
excessive sentences? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1 Has McPeak failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that the 
detention, search, and seizure of contraband from McPeak's vehicle was 
justified? 




McPeak Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That The 
Detention, Search, And Seizure Of Contraband From His Vehicle Was Justified 
A. Introduction 
McPeak argues the police lacked iegal justification "to initiate a traffic 
stop," therefore the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-11.) Given the totality of the circumstances found by the 
district court and substantially supported by the investigating officer's testimony, 
McPeak was validly detained. McPeak does not challenge the validity of the 
subsequent search and seizure, except to argue the seized evidence should be 
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) Accordingly, 
this Court should affirm the order denying McPeak's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a decision on a suppression motion is challenged, the appellate 
court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 
_, 301 P.3d 242, 251 (2013). The appellate court first accepts the trial court's 
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, then freely reviews 
the application of constitutional principles to those facts. & 
C. Given The Totality Of The Circumstances, The Detention Of McPeak's 
Vehicle Was Legally Justified 
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
State v. Anderson, 1 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). 
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or the search was "otherwise reasonable under circumstances." State v. 
Johnson, 1 Idaho 56, 61, 266 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Ct. App. 2011) (citation 
omitted). Under the automobile exception, a police officer may search a vehicle 
if there is probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime. 19.:. (citing 
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991).) Also, an 
officer is entitled to conduct an investigatory if the officer "observes conduct 
which leads to the reasonable conclusion that 'criminal afoot."' 
131 Idaho 550,553,961 P.2d 641,644 (1998) (citation omitted); 
also Terry v. 01 nu, ::: ' 1 (1968). 
"A reasonable-suspicion determination 'need not rise to the level required 
for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance 
of the evidence standard."' State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 126, 233 P.3d 52, 57 
(2010) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). Reasonable 
suspicion is more than speculation or an inchoate hunch about criminal activity, 
but must be based on articulable facts - considering the totality of circumstances 
- that the one being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. State v. Bordeaux, 148 
Idaho 1, 6, 217 P.3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Widner, Idaho_, 317 
P.3d 737, 741 (2013); State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 
(Ct. App. 2010). 
The totality of the circumstances confronting the officer here provided 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The officer testified he was 
alerted about an assault involving a knife that occurred in the general direction 
where he was heading. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 19-21; p. 20, L. 10.) The 
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dispatch call identified the suspect as David McPeak, and indicated McPeak ieft 
the scene of his assault in a white Ford truck. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 15-17.) 
The officer testified he spotted a white Ford pickup and pulled behind it - without 
activating any special lights -to read its license plate. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 9-
11, 20-21; p. 19, Ls. 6-8.) When he pulled behind the truck it slowed down to 15 
miles per hour, abruptly turned off Indiana Avenue onto Maple Street without 
signaling, slowed again to five miles per hour, and then stopped on the side of 
the road. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 18, L. 25 - p. 19, L. 5.) The officer shined a spotlight 
on the truck and saw its occupants "shifting around a lot, so I activated my lights" 
to detain the occupants as a "high risk traffic stop." (11/13/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 11-
20.) These articulable facts sufficiently demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that 
the truck's occupants were or had been engaged in criminal activity. 
Arguing otherwise, McPeak cites State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 
169 P.3d 291 (Ct. App. 2007). In that case, a caller - concerned about drive-by 
shootings - informed police a car had driven past his house twice that evening. 
kl at 705, 169 P.3d at 293. The caller described the car as "a white passenger 
car, maybe a Corsica or a Buick, and did not include a license plate number." kl 
at 708, 169 P.3d at 296. The caller did not "indicate how much time had passed 
since the suspicious vehicle had last driven past his house." ~ at 705, 169 P.3d 
at 293. The Court of Appeals in that case determined that "the officers did not 
possess a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Zapata-Reyes had 
committed or was about to commit a crime." Id. But the totality of the 
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circumstances here, in contrast to Zapata-Reyes, provided more than 
speculation or an inchoate hunch that McPeak was involved in criminal activity. 
The totality of circumstances in McPeak's case included that the suspect 
car was a white Ford truck, but also that the officer observed suspicious driving 
behavior (slowing and coming to a stop despite that the officer did not activate 
overhead lights). (11/13/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 1-8.) After the truck stopped, the 
occupants' movements were "almost like they were trying to hide something or 
stuff stuff under their seat." (11/13/12 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 6-9.) In addition, the officer 
was advised that the driver of the white Ford truck was suspected of assault 
· ;;) - •.,--. .••. ,. .. ,,...,,eel"' 11, /;:..o;:,,e-Reves, 144 Idaho at 705, 169 P.3d at 293, 
the defendant was detained on suspicion of having driven by a house twice 
which, without more, is not a criminal activity. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 16-17.) 
Comparing the circumstances, Zapata-Reyes is factually distinguishable. 
McPeak also cites State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d 1121 (2013). 
In Morgan, a police officer conducted a traffic stop after observing Morgan make 
four left-hand turns. kt at 111, 294 P.3d at 1123. McPeak likens Morgan's four 
turns to McPeak's slow-down, turn, slow-down and stop. (Appellant's brief, p. 
10.) But again, the officer's reasonable suspicion here was based on more than 
McPeak's suspicious driving behavior alone. Thus, Morgan is factually 
distinguishable as well. 
The reasonable-suspicion inquiry requires consideration of the totality of 
circumstances, not one circumstance, or a partial circumstance. Widner, 
Idaho at _, 317 P.3d at 741; Horton, 150 Idaho at 302, 246 P.3d at 675; 
8 
Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 6, 217 P.3d at 6. McPeak's case is factually more 
similar to other cases in which the denials of motions to suppress were affirmed 
on finding that the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion warranting 
a suspect's detention, based on the totality of multiple circumstances. See State 
v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653, 656-57, 262 P.3d 682, 685-86 (Ct. App. 2011) (officer 
was in general area to which suspects had been running, defendant's attire 
matched description of suspect and walked briskly); State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 
470, 474-75, 210 P.3d 578, 582-83 (Ct. App. 2009) (officer responding to 
dispatch about an armed robbery that had just occurred, had reasonable and 
articulable suspicion to detain suspects who he observed driving at suspiciously 
slow rate of speed, and "jumping around or moving around in [the] car really 
fast); Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8, 217 P.3d at 8 (detention of vehicle at border was 
justified where the vehicle matched the description of suspect vehicle, and 
vehicle was spotted 15-20 minutes after the information was relayed by the 
customs official). 
Here, as in those cases, there were multiple circumstances before the 
officer that, when considered in totality, justified Mcpeak's detention. The officer 
had more than mere speculation or a hunch, but a reasonable suspicion that 
McPeak was involved - or had been - in criminal activity. McPeak has failed to 
show error in the district court's conclusion the officer had a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion to detain McPeak's vehicle. Therefore, the Court should 
reject McPeak's argument and affirm the order denying the motion to suppress. 
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II. 
McPeak Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
Introduction 
McPeak does not dispute that his sentence was within statutory limits, but 
argues it was excessive and an abuse of the sentencing court's discretion. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.) Applying Idaho's well-established standard of 
review for an excessive-sentence challenge, McPeak fails to satisfy his appellate 
burden. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits 
absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 
P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). In reviewing for abuse of discretion, the 
appellate court considers whether the district court (1) was aware its decision 
was discretionary, (2) acted within the scope of its discretion and consistent with 
applicable law, and (3) reached its decision through exercise of reason. State v. 
Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011 ). To meet his burden on 
appeal, McPeak must show his sentence is excessive "under any reasonable 
view of the facts," considering the primary objective of criminal punishment -
protecting society - as well as the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution. Windom, 150 Idaho at 876-77, 253 P.3d at 313-14. 
In reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court 
independently reviews the record, examining "the nature of the offense, the 
offender's character and the protection of the public interest." State v. Delling, 
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152 Idaho 122, 132, 267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011) (citation omitted). Where 
reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sentence is excessive, the 
appellate court will not disturb it. Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 
(citation omitted). Stated another way, the court on appeal "will set aside the 
sentence only where reasonable minds could not differ as to the excessiveness 
of the sentence." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974 
(2005). 
For purposes of its review, the appellate court "considers the fixed term of 
confinement as the sentence imposed." hl: (citing State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 
791,797, 69 P.3d 1052, 1058 (2003).) 
C. McPeak Has Failed To Show His Seven-Year Fixed Term Is Excessive 
Under Any Reasonable View Of The Facts 
McPeak cites, as mitigating factors, that he said he was sorry for having 
lost his temper and yelled at Angela Marsh, and that he told the court he "did not 
drink, smoke or use alcohol." (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14 (citing 3/21/13 Tr., p. 
41, Ls. 10-13; p. 43, Ls. 22-25).) McPeak also states that he owned two 
businesses, had strong job skills in many fields, and that he believed he would 
have employment and a place to stay if released. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) 
None of these factors, even if credible and taken together, demonstrate that his 
seven-year fixed sentence is excessive, in light of the information before the 
sentencing court. 
In the presentence investigation (PSI) report, the investigator noted that 
McPeak admitted yelling at Angela Marsh after "kicking in" her door, and 
acknowledged he has "anger management problems." (PSI, pp. 4, 17, 20-21.) 
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Marsh had reported to police McPeak kicked in her front stormed 
and held a near her yelling that her husband had stolen his tools and 
"I kill " (PSI, 3.) The PSI details McPeak's 31-year criminal history, 
dating back to 1981. (PSI, pp. 4-11.) A court-ordered substance abuse 
assessment could not be completed "due to [McPeak's] uncooperative behavior." 
(PSI, p. 20.) 
At sentencing, the district court stated, "one of the factors the court has to 
consider is the protection of community." (3/21/13 Tr., p. 50, Ls. 22-23.) The 
court continued, "when presented with somebody with such anger, and 
sometimes misplaced anger, the court has to be concerned about the protection 
of the community, and I am." (3/21/13 Tr., p. 50, 23 - p. 51, L. 1.) The court 
expressed that rehabilitative programs are geared toward younger offenders 
rather than 49-50 year olds such as McPeak. (3/21/13 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 2-9.) The 
court stated, "I think your attitude and your anger really places you in bad stead 
with the courts, with law enforcement, and if you don't get on top of it then really 
the only protection for the community is to place you in prison." (3/21/13 Tr., p. 
51, Ls. 17-21.) The court then added that it was "very skeptical that you have 
the ability to control that anger as you said that you do." (3/21/13 Tr., p. 51, 
21-23.) 
The court imposed a ten-year term with seven years fixed as to the 
burglary charge, and a consecutive indeterminate term of seven years on the 
possession of methamphetamine charge. (3/21/13 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 7-15.) The 
court retained jurisdiction, saying, 'Tm going to have you evaluated by the 
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Department of Corrections, and they can decide which is the appropriate 
programming that you go through. And if you successfully complete the 
programming, the court will consider probation." (3/21/13 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 16-21.) 
The court summarized: 
... what I'm doing effectively is giving you an opportunity to get on 
top of your anger, which is really what the court considers your risk 
to the community. And if you don't, the court will be relinquishing 
jurisdiction, and you're going to be looking at that lengthy prison 
sentence. But I'm placing you in control, and you need to take 
advantage of it 
(3/21/13 Tr., p. 52, L 22 - p. 53, L. 4.) The court's comments demonstrate its 
focus on the primary objective of criminal punishment - protecting society. Also, 
the court addressed McPeak's rehabilitative potential, leaving open the 
possibility of probation if McPeak seized his opportunity to successfully engage 
in programming. McPeak has failed to show that under any reasonable view of 
the facts, the district court abused its discretion. Therefore this Court should 
reject his argument. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the order denying 
McPeak's motion to suppress, the judgment of conviction, and McPeak's 
sentence. 
DATED this 17th day of March, 2014. 
~~ DAPHNEiHLJAN~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
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